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The Liability of Officers and Directors Under the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 
1989 
Jon Shepherd 
In August 1989 President George Bush signed the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)1 into law. 
Congress enacted FIRREA in response to its concern over the increas-
ing losses sustained by the savings and loan industry and the costs to 
the taxpayers of the resulting bailout. 2 FIRREA attempts to avert 
future problems caused by mismanagement of both savings and loan 
associations (S&Ls) and banks, and furnishes funds for the S&L 
bailout.3 
FIRREA also imposes civil liability on officers and directors who 
mismanage insured depository institutions. Toward this goal, FIR-
REA supplies a standard of liability under which the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can sue S&L officers and directors.4 
This standard, found in section 1821(k), states that 
[a] director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held 
personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf 
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A.). 
2. See, e.g., Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1013, 1013 (1990) (stating 
that over 500 savings associations failed between 1980 and 1988); Robert A. Rosenblatt, House 
Panel Lowers Ceiling on RTC's Borrowing by 75%, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at Dl (total price 
tag of bailout could exceed $500 billion). The stories describing some of the failed S&L's are 
appalling. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, U.S. to File S&L Lawsuit Against Arizona Governor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at Dl (Regulators accused Arizona's governor of improperly taking $8 
million in "development fees" for a real estate deal while he was a director of an S&L that 
invested $52 million and ultimately lost $38 million in the same deal. The governor and a part-
ner were also guaranteed 38% of the deal's profits for only a $432 investment.); David R. Sands, 
FDIC Sues McLean S&L Ex-Officials, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1991, at CS (FDIC alleges officials 
made $7.6 million in unsecured loans to subsidiary that was losing $12 million, and that two 
officials received bonuses for anticipated profits that never materialized). 
3. Congress, in enacting FIRREA, also abolished the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC) and transferred its functions and property, including the right to sue of-
ficers and directors of failed institutions, to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 354-363 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1437 note 
(West Supp. 1991)). 
4. When the FDIC acts in its capacity as a receiver, it acts as the institution for which it is 
responsible. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 385-86 n.l (6th Cir. 1990) (explaining how the 
FDIC becomes a receiver of a finanical institution); FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1539-40 
(11th Cir. 1989) (same); Peter G. Weinstock, Directors and Officers of Failing Banks: Pitfalls and 
Precautions, 106 BANKING L.J. 434, 434-35 n.4 (1989). FIRREA also provides that the FDIC as 
receiver shall succeed to "all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of ... any stockholder, member, 
accountholder, depositor, officer, or director of [a financial institution]." 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 1989). 
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of, or at the request or direction of the Corporation, which action is 
prosecuted wholly or partially for the benefit of the Corporation -
(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution, 
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased 
from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conser-
vator, or 
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased 
from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed in whole or in part by an 
insured depository institution or its affiliate in connection with assist-
ance provided under section 1823 of this title, 
for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that dem-
onstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) 
including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and de-
termined under applicable State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall im-
pair or affect any right of the corporation under other applicable law. 5 
Congress intended section 1821(k) to preempt state "insulating" stat-
utes, which commonly shield the directors and officers of corporations 
and financial institutions from suits for breach of a duty to the institu-
tion. 6 These statutes typically shield directors and officers from liabil-
ity for certain breaches of fiduciary duty or permit the articles of 
incorporation to do so. They do not, however, permit corporations to 
protect these actors when they engage in reckless or intentional mis-
conduct. 7 In states that limit liability of directors and officers to that 
resulting from particularly egregious behavior, FIRREA expands po-
tential liability by holding agents of financial institutions to a more 
stringent standard of care. 
Several courts have held that FIRREA mandates a uniform federal 
5. 12 U.S.C.A. 182l(k) (West 1989) (emphasis added). 
6. See 135 CONG. REc. S4278-79 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Riegle). 
7. For examples of state insulating statutes, see ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (1989); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054(A)(9) (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Michie 
Supp. 1991); CAL. CORP. CoDE § 204(a)(10) (1990); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-tol(u) (Supp. 
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) 
(Michie 1989); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 23-415-48.5 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE§ 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 
1991); IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-35-l(e) (West Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.832 (West 
1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d) 
(Michie 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991); MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1991); 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(l) (1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 450.1209(c) (West 
1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(2) 
(Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037(1) (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54(1-n) 
(Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E) 
(Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 55-2-02(b)(3) (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 60.047(2)(c) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-l.l-48(a)(6) (Supp. 1991); s.c. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-2-102(e) (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 47-2-58.8 (1991); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (Supp. 1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(B) (West 
Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-10-49.l (1991); WASH. REV. CODE§ 23B.08.320 (1989); 
WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 180.0828 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT.§ 17-16-834 (1989). For a general 
discussion of state insulating statutes, see James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legisla-
tion on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988). 
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standard of care governing the liability of officers and directors of fi-
nancial institutions, thus preempting all state laws on this subject. 8 
Other courts, however, have held that section 182l(k) merely estab-
lishes a minimum standard of care for the liability of officers and di-
rectors of financial institutions and does not prevent states from 
applying more stringent standards.9 Because the FDIC is pursuing 
numerous cases against the officers and directors of failed S&Ls, 10 
many courts will address this issue in the near future. 
This Note argues that FIRREA's gross negligence standard imple-
ments a minimum federal requirement that preempts state law only to 
the extent state law provides a more relaxed criterion. Part I examines 
the plain meaning of the statute and concludes that FIRREA 
preempts state law only to the extent the state law standard of care is 
lower than gross negligence. Part II scrutinizes FIRREA's legislative 
history and demonstrates that Congress did not intend to prevent 
states from imposing more stringent standards of liability. Part III 
analyzes the policies behind FIRREA and argues that the statute's 
8. See, e.g., Gaffv. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 1990) (assuming without discussing); 
FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Minn. 1991); FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533 (D. 
Utah 1991); FDIC v. Brown, No. NC89-30G, 1991 WL 294524 (D. Utah Nov. 18, 1991); cf. 
FDIC v. Miller, No. 90-C5515, 1991 WL 280026, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1991) (federal claims 
preempted by FIRREA). 
Two different types of S&Ls exist - state-chartered and federally-chartered. Prior to FIR-
REA, most courts apparently applied state common law to breach of duty claims brought against 
the officers and directors of state-chartered insolvent institutions and federal common law to 
claims against federally-chartered institutions. Compare FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1546 
(11th Cir. 1989) (rejecting formulation of federal common law in favor of state law); FSLIC v. 
Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1324 (8th Cir. 1988) ("claims ... have ... origin in state law"); FSLIC 
v. Ticktin, 832 F.2d 1438, 1445-46 (7th Cir. 1987) (state law applied), revd. on other grounds, 490 
U.S. 82 (1989); Amerifirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1373-74 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (same) 
with Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Kidwell, 672 F. Supp. 436, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (federal 
common law applied); First Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander, 558 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D. Haw. 
1983) (same); FDIC v. Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D.P.R. 1981) (same). This Note discusses 
only the debate over whether section 1821(k) preempts the application of state common law in 
suits for breach of duty brought by the FDIC against the officers and directors of insolvent state-
chartered financial institutions. A discussion of the effect of section 1821(k) on the federal com-
mon law is beyond the scope of this Note. But see Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) 
(finding that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act displaces federal common law, implying 
that federal common law may be preempted by FIRREA); FDIC v. Miller, No. 90-C5515, 1991 
WL 280026, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1991) (holding that FIRREA preempts federal, but not 
state, common law). 
9. See, e.g., FDIC v. Williams, No. CA3-91-1428-C, 1991WL263922, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 
27, 1991); FDIC v. Miller, No. 90-C5515, 1991 WL 280026, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1991); 
FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828, 832 (D. Colo. 1991); FDIC v. Black, 777 F. Supp. 919, 922 
(W.D. Okla. 1991); FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1158-59 (S.D. Cal. 1991); FDIC v. 
Haddad, No. 90-0779-CIV, 1991 WL 252965, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 1991); FDIC v. Burrell, 
1991 WL 256362, at *4 (S.D. Iowa July 17, 1991). 
10. See, e.g., Thomas P. Vartanian & Michael D. Schley, Bank Officer and Director Liability 
- Regulatory Actions, 39 Bus. LAW. 1021, 1021 (1984) (stating that since the early 1980s, of-
ficers and directors have been more likely to be defendants in suits brought by federal regulators 
than at any other time); see also F.D.L C Sues Officials of Failed Texas Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 
26, 1991, at D16; Guaranty Federal Ex-Official, Law Firm Are Sued by FDIC. WALL ST. J., Oct. 
1, 1991, at A9. 
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purposes are best served by allowing states to impose a more stringent 
standard of care than the standard Congress provided in FIRREA. 
I. PLAIN MEANING OF SECTION 182l(k) 
When interpreting a statute, courts "must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress" by following the statute's 
plain meaning.11 To determine a statute's plain meaning, courts 
"must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the 
language and design of the statute as a whole." 12 Further, when focus-
ing on specific statutory language, courts must give that language its 
"ordinary meaning."13 A word's "ordinary meaning" has been inter-
preted by the courts as being the dictionary meaning given to that 
word.14 
Section 1821(k) provides that directors or officers of insured insti-
tutions may be held personally liable for conduct that demonstrates 
gross negligence or a greater disregard of that standard of care. In 
other words, the FDIC may bring suits for gross negligence, or for 
simple negligence in states that allow such actions. 15 Because the stat-
ute does not profess to provide an exclusive standard of care, courts 
should not imply such exclusivity.16 If Congress had intended to re-
move negligence suits pursued under state law from the FDIC's arse-
nal, Congress could have said that "[a] director or officer of an insured 
depository institution may be held liable . . . only for gross 
negligence." 
The nonexclusive nature of the first sentence in section 1821(k), 
which imposes the gross negligence standard, sheds light on the provi-
sion's next sentence. The second sentence clarifies the first: Congress 
did not intend section 182l(k) to "impair or affect any right of the 
Corporation under other applicable law."17 This portion of the statute 
suggests that section 1821(k) neither promulgates a uniform standard 
of care nor preempts the FDIC's right to pursue actions for simple 
negligence under state law. Indeed, if the first sentence created an ex-
11. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Assn., 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1163 
(1991) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984)); see 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CoNSTR. § 46.05 (Norman T. Singer ed., 4th ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. 
12. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); see 2A SUTHERLAND, supra 
note 11, at § 46.05. 
13. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 
1, 9 (1962)); 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 11, at § 47.28. 
14. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2660 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring), 
15. FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 1991). 
16. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 627-28 (1987) (recognizing that Congress is explicit when 
desiring to preempt state jurisdiction over areas traditionally within state law). 
17. 12 U.S.C.A. § 182l(k) (West 1989). 
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elusive standard of care, the second sentence would be surplusage;18 
such a reading would violate "the elementary canon of construction 
that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoper-
ative." 19 Moreover, if the first sentence somehow provides a uniform 
standard of care, the first and second sentences of section 1821(k) are 
contradictory: the first sentence would preempt all other law in this 
area while the second preserves rights belonging to the FDIC under 
existing law.20 Additionally, a separate rule of statutory construction 
dictates that "applicable law" includes all relevant law not otherwise 
specifically excluded.21 
Moreover, both federal22 and state courts23 have long held direc-
tors of financial institutions24 liable for negligent mismanagement of 
their institutions. Therefore, the canon of statutory construction that 
"[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless 
the language of a statute [is] clear and explicit for this purpose"25 is 
18. Mcsweeney, 772 F. Supp. at 1158. 
19. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (quot-
ing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)); see also United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 
822, 828 (1984) (Court reads statute "as a whole"); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 13 
(1947) (stating that courts cannot construe one section of an act so as to defeat the intention of 
another or to frustrate the act as a whole); 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 11, at § 46.06 (each 
word must be given meaning). 
20. A minority of courts has suggested that the second sentence of section 182l(k) refers to 
other provisions of FIRREA. However, this assertion is refutable. See infra notes 38-45 and 
accompanying text. 
21. See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Assn., 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1163 
(1991) ("[T]he phrase 'all other law' indicates no limitation."); see also Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 145-46 (1967); Bluewaters, Inc. v. Boag, 320 F.2d 833, 835 (1st Cir. 1963) (" 'ap-
plicable' ordinarily means related to"); Vytar Assocs. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 483 A.2d 1263, 
1266 n.4 (Md. 1984) ("other" is an uncompromising word to be defined broadly); Hodges v. 
Canal Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 630, 633 (Miss. 1969) ("applicable" means "capable of being 
applied"). 
22. See Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 513 (1919); Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 
165-66 (1891); FDIC v. Greenwood, 739 F. Supp. 450, 451 (C.D. Ill. 1989); FDIC v. Butcher, 
660 F. Supp. 1274, 1277-78 (E.D. Tenn. 1987). 
23. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Huff, 704 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1985); Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 
N.E. 42 (Mass. 1930); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981); Litwin v. Allen, 
25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Warren v. Robison, 57 P. 287 (Utah 1899). 
24. Courts have not distinguished "banks" from "savings and loan associations" in the con-
text of the duties owed to depositors by officers and directors. Furthermore, FIRREA substi-
tuted "insured depository institution" for "insured bank" in all relevant provisions. Pub. L. No. 
101-73, § 20l(a)(l), 103 Stat. 187 (1989). An "insured depository institution" was then defined 
as including "any bank or savings association the deposits of which are insured by the Corpora-
tion pursuant to the Act." FIRREA, § 204(c)(2), 103 Stat. 191 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. 
1813(c)(2) (West 1989)). 
25. Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. C & P Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983) (quoting 
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1812)); see also lsbrandtsen 
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1880); 2A 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 11, at § 50.01 (courts should not interpret a statute to supplant the 
common law absent an indication the legislature intends for them to do so); id. at§ 50.05 (recog-
nizing the presumption that a statute is consistent with the common law); 3 SUTHERLAND, supra 
note 11, at § 61.01 (courts strictly construe statutes in derogation of the common law and a clear 
and plain expression must exist if a change is to be made in the common law). 
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particularly relevant. If section 182l(k) created an exclusive remedy, 
the FDIC would no longer have the federal and state common law 
causes of action in its arsenal. 26 The plain language of section 1821 (k) 
does not indicate that Congress sought or desired such a result.27 Fur-
thermore, the last sentence of section 182l(k) suggests that Congress 
did not intend to preempt any state common law that imposes a stan-
dard of care equal to or greater than gross negligence. 28 One court has 
referred to this caveat as "the very antithesis of a repealer."29 
In addition to the presumption favoring the common law, a pre-
sumption also exists that Congress does not intend a federal regulation 
to intrude unnecessarily into traditional areas of state responsibility.30 
States have long controlled the standards of care under which officers 
and directors may be found liable for breach of a duty to the institu-
tion. 31 The plain language of section 182l(k) suggests that FIRREA 
preempts only those state laws that impose a more lenient standard of 
care than gross negligence. Because reading section 1821(k) as a uni-
form standard would preempt all state law pertaining to the liability of 
officers and directors of financial institutions, FIRREA would infringe 
upon a traditional area of state responsibility without the requisite lan-
guage or intent32 required to do so. 33 
Moreover, FIRREA provides that the FDIC as conservator or re-
ceiver34 succeeds to all rights of the stockholders (if any), members, 
account holders, depositors, officers, and directors of a failed financial 
institution, including all rights belonging to the institution itself.35 
This provision creates an anomaly, however, if courts interpret section 
182l(k) to impose a gross negligence standard in all cases brought by 
the FDIC. Because an institution itself may pursue claims against its 
officers and directors for conduct that does not rise to the level of gross 
negligence,36 section 182l(k) would subject the FDIC, the federal reg-
26. FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 1991). 
27. In fact, Part II demonstrates that the Senate specifically disavowed any intent to infringe 
generally upon state law. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text. 
28. Mcsweeney. 772 F. Supp. at 1159. 
29. FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828, 831 (D. Colo. 1991). 
30. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1987). 
31. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (stating that legislation in the area of 
officer and director liability "is generally enacted against the background of existing state law"); 
see, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663, 663-68 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory 
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 252 (1977); cases cited supra notes 8 and 23. 
32. The legislative history of§ 1821(k) suggests that Congress intended only limited preemp-
tion of state law. See infra Part II. 
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
34. The FDIC can transfer all rights accruing to it in its capacity as receiver to the FDIC in 
its corporate capacity. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(d)(l) (West 1989). 
35. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 1989). 
36. See supra note 4. 
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ulator of financial institutions, to a greater standard of proof than 
other civil litigants. 37 
Two courts38 have concluded that the second sentence of section 
182l{k) - the savings provision - refers only to other sections of 
FIRREA, principally sections 181839 and 1821(/).40 Under this view, 
Congress did not intend to preserve common law causes of action, but 
merely desired to avoid inconsistencies within FIRREA. This read-
ing, however, is inconsistent with the statutory language. Section 1818 
provides the FDIC with authority to take certain administrative en-
forcement actions against officers or directors of depository institu-
tions.41 Section 1821(k) applies only to civil actions brought by the 
FDIC, so its gross negligence standard does not apply to enforcement 
actions taken pursuant to section 1818.42 Similarly, section 1821(/) 
defines the proper measure of damages for various parties, including 
officers and directors, who are found liable for the "improvident or 
otherwise improper use or investment of any insured depository insti-
tution's assets .... "43 The savings provision of section 182l{k) is not 
needed to preserve the measure of damages announced in section 
1821(/) because section 1821(/) applies only to violators of the stan-
dard of care promulgated by section 1821(k). 
The minority view that "other applicable law" refers only to other 
sections of FIRREA reads section 1821(k) to say "[n]othing in FIR-
REA shall affect the rights of the FDIC found in FIRREA." This 
awkward reading is precisely why a statute refers to itself, rather than 
to other federal or state law, "by stating 'in this Title' or 'in this Chap-
ter.' "44 The absence of such language in section 182l(k) implies that 
Congress intended the savings provision to apply generally to all 
"other applicable law." Interpreting section 1821(k) to provide a uni-
form standard of gross negligence renders its savings provision point-
less. The term "other applicable law" must refer to laws outside 
FIRREA.45 
37. See FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991). 
38. FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1247 (D. Minn. 1991); FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. 
Supp. 533, 537 (D. Utah 1991). 
39. 12 U.S.C.A § 1818 (West 1989). 
40. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(/) (West 1989). 
41. Such actions include termination of insurance; cease-and-desist orders; removal, suspen-
sion and prohibition of reentry of any officer or director of an insured institution; and civil money 
penalties for certain acts by an institution or an institution-related party. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818 
(West 1989). 
42. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(a)(2)(A) (West 1989) (stating that the FDIC can terminate de-
posit insurance if an institution engages in unsafe or unsound practices, is in an unsafe or un-
sound condition, or violates any applicable law or regulation). 
43. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(/) (West 1989). 
44. FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (noting such references in 
12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(e)(8) and 182l(i)). 
45. FDIC v. Haddad, No. 90-0779-CIV, 1991 WL 252965, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 1991); 
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In a slightly different vein, the court in FDIC v. Swager stated that 
"other applicable law" as used in section 1821(k) means all applicable 
law other than state law.46 The court believed that because Congress 
used the word "state" in the first sentence of section 182l(k), Congress 
would have used the word "state" in the second sentence if it had 
intended to include state law within "other applicable law."47 The 
court stated that if Congress had intended section 182l(k) to 
strengthen or broaden the FDIC's power to recover damages from in-
solvent bank directors and officers, the final sentence should have read: 
"Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Cor-
poration under any applicable law."48 The Swager court's argument 
thus rests on a one word distinction: "other" versus "any." Not only 
does this change fail to alter the meaning of section 1821(k),49 but it 
also unduly emphasizes a distinction that Congress probably did not 
contemplate. One can also turn the Swager rationale on its head: if 
Congress intended to save only federal laws, it would have stated, in 
the second sentence, that "federal law is not impaired or affected by 
section 1821(k)." Alternatively, if Congress desired to preempt all 
state law other than that which defines the terms "gross negligence" 
and "intentional tortious conduct," it would have stated, in the sec-
ond sentence of section 1821(k), that "all other applicable state law is 
preempted." 
The plain language of section 182l(k) supports the interpretation 
that it establishes a minimum standard of care. Because the last sen-
tence of section 1821(k) states that FIRREA does not affect the 
FDIC's rights under "other applicable law," the FDIC can still pursue 
negligence actions in those states that allow them. To read section 
1821(k) in any other way would ignore the plain language of the 
statute. 
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
This Part examines the legislative history of FIRREA and con-
cludes that Congress intended to preempt only those state laws that 
insulate officers and directors from liability for conduct violating stan-
see Home Sav. Bank v. Gillam, No. 90-35765, 1991 WL 276241, at *9 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 1991) 
(§ 1821's "other applicable law must, at a minimum, include other types oflegal actions permit-
ted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act"); cf. IRS v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922, 930 (1990). In IRS 
v. FLRA, the Court was interpreting language found in § 7106(a)(2) of the Civil Service Reform 
Act. 494 U.S. at 926-27. The Court held that to interpret the language "nothing in this chapter 
shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency •.• in accordance with appli-
cable laws" as applying to other provisions of the Reform Act would make the provision "a 
pointless tautology. It is clear that the term 'applicable laws' refers to laws outside the Act." 494 
U.S. at 930. 
46. FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (D. Minn. 1991). 
47. 773 F. Supp. at 1248. 
48. 773 F. Supp. at 1248. 
49. For alternative definitions of "other applicable law" see supra note 21. 
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<lards of care equal to or less stringent than gross negligence. Section 
II.A shows that the Senate specifically desired FIRREA to have such 
an effect. Section 11.B explains that the House and the Confere:i;ice 
Committee, although making inconsequential changes in the language 
of the Senate version of the bill, did not mean to alter the meaning of 
section 1821(k) as it was promulgated by the Senate. Section 11.C 
demonstrates that the Senate did not believe that the House and Con-
ference Committee version of FIRREA had altered the meaning of 
section 1821(k). When considered as a whole, the legislative history of 
section 1821(k) indicates that Congress intended to promulgate a min-
imum standard of liability for the directors and officers of insured fi-
nancial institutions. 
A. Senate Intent 
The Senate clearly expressed its intent to enact a statute that only 
preempted state law to the extent of preempting insulating statutes. 50 
The original Senate version of FIRREA provided that 
"[n]otwithstanding any provision of State law, a director or officer ... 
may be held personally liable . . . for any cause of action available at 
common law, including, but not limited to[] negligence [and] gross neg-
ligence .... "51 
The bill's managers then amended the bill on the Senate floor to state 
that a director or officer of an insured financial institution may be held 
personally liable in suits brought by the FDIC: 
"for gross negligence or intentional tortious conduct, as those terms are 
defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this par-
agraph shall impair or affect any right, if any, of the Corporation that 
may have existed immediately prior to the enactment of the PIRRE 
Act."52 
One of the bill's managers, Senator Riegle, stated that although 
"[t]he reported bill totally preempted State law ... with respect to 
suits brought by the FDIC against bank directors or officers ... the 
managers' amendment scales back the scope of this preemption. "53 
Senator Riegle added that "[u]nder the managers' amendment, State 
law would be overruled only to the extent that it forbids the FDIC to 
bring suit based on 'gross negligence' or an 'intentional tort.' " 54 Fur-
thermore, the Managers' Report that accompanied the Senate version 
of FIRREA stated that FIRREA "does not prevent the FDIC from 
pursuing claims under State law or under other applicable Federal 
law, if such law permits the officers or directors of a financial institu-
50. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for an explanation and list of insulating statutes. 
51. S. 774, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. § 214(n) (1989). 
52. 135 CoNG. REc. 84318 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989). 
53. Id. at 84278-79 (statement of Sen. Riegle). 
54. Id. at 84279. 
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tion to be sued for violating a lower standard of care, such as 
simple negligence ... . "ss 
Comments made during the Senate floor debate over FIRREA also 
indicate that the Senate intended to enact a bill that only preempts 
insulating statutes and allows the FDIC to bring negligence claims in 
those jurisdictions that allow them. S6 Senator Roth remarked that the 
bill did not "pre-empt State corporation law in any general way. . . . It 
is surgically designed to protect the Federal interest, the taxpayers' 
interest, and no other."s7 A second senator commented that the "bill 
adds several important provisions to help prosecutors make their cases 
and to speed[] recovery oflost funds."ss This statement demonstrates 
that courts should not read section 1821(k) to mandate a uniform 
gross negligence standard. Such an interpretation conflicts with the 
intent of the Senate because the FDIC would have to conform its 
pleadings and proof to a gross negligence standard in cases where a 
simple negligence standard previously would have applied.s9 
During the debates, yet another senator remarked that FIRREA 
was needed "to avoid the risky investment activities that have crippled 
so many S&L's .... "60 This statement suggests that the Senate in-
tended to suppress those speculative investment practices that helped 
55. S. REP. No. 19, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1989). In FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533 
(D. Utah 1991), the court indicated that it did not find the report persuasive because (1) the 
Banking Comittee did not issue the report until two months after the Senate had considered its 
version of FIRREA, (2) the report was not directed to the final version of FIRREA, and (3) the 
report failed to consider the before-enactment/after-enactment distinction in the last sentence of 
the section. 763 F. Supp. at 539. However, as Senator Cranston explained, "there was no sec-
tion-by-section analysis provided by the committee for the bill when it was reported simply be· 
cause of the time rush constraints facing the committee as it moved the bill to the floor." 135 
CoNG. REc. S4283 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Cranston). Additionally, the 
report merely restates the remarks that Senator Riegle made on the Senate floor during the de· 
bate over the bill. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Furthermore, reports are often 
published after the adoption of a bill and still considered to be authoritative. See, e.g .. Home Sav. 
Bank v. Gillam, No. 90-35765, 1991 WL 276241, at *9-10 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 1991) (citing the 
committee report as authority for its conclusion). With respect to the second criticism, the Sen-
ate considered the House changes in the bill and did not indicate that it felt the House had made 
any substantive changes in the provision adopted by the Senate. See infra notes 80-85 and ac-
companying text. The third criticism is specious because no before/after distinction exists in the 
second sentence of§ 182l(k), so it is obvious that the Senate intended its bill to allow negligence 
actions, which could be brought by the FDIC before the enactment of FIRREA, also to be 
brought after FIRREA's enactment. 
, 56. The Senate also accepted a suggestion offered by Senator Heinz that the RICO statute be 
amended to include additional predicate offenses relating to bank and financial fraud. 135 CoNo. 
REC. S4115 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1989). This amendment demonstrates that Congress wanted to 
expand the penalties for harming depository institutions, not contract them. 
57. 135 CONG. REc. S4281 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989). Senator Garn, one of the bill's manag-
ers, concurred. See id. ("We are not imposing any rules that go beyond our purpose. Section 
[1821(k)] is not a general provision. It is limited."). 
58. 135 CONG. REc. S4000 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dixon) (emphasis 
added). 
59. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
60. 135 CONG. REC. S4239 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Burns). 
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cause the S&L crisis. The interpretation of section 1821(k) as a mini-
mum standard is consistent with this purpose. Such a standard curbs 
dangerous investment practices by increasing the potential sanctions 
on officers and directors if the investments harm the institution. 61 A 
fourth senator stated that FIRREA "increases the enforcement powers 
and remedies the Government has to go after fraudulent and incompe-
tent practices."62 The minority view that section 182l(k) is a uniform 
standard would, to the contrary, decrease the effectiveness of the 
FDIC's enforcement practices. Under the uniform standard of care, a 
negligent officer or director may escape liability under the enforcement 
mechanisms, leaving the FDIC with no other avenue to regain lost 
funds. 63 
In support of the uniform standard interpretation, the court in 
FDIC v. Canfield 64 used the statements of Senators Heflin and Sanford 
expressing concern over the FDIC's authority over state institutions. 
The court suggested that these senators desired a general preemption 
of state law, rather than a preemption of only insulating statutes. 65 
This interpretation, however, is largely unfounded. For example, not 
only did Senator Heflin direct his comments at the civil penalties in-
cluded in Title IX of the bill - not section 1821(k), which is found in 
Title II - but he also stated that his recommendations were minor. 66 
Senator Sanford expressed support for the managers' amendments, 
which, as previously noted, were intended only to preempt insulating 
statutes. 67 
B. House and Conference Committee Intent 
Neither the House of Representatives nor the Conference Commit-
tee expressly addressed the issue of whether section 1821(k) provides a 
uniform standard or a minimum standard of gross negligence. The 
61. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text. 
62. 135 CONG. REc. S4303 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis 
added). 
63. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
64. 763 F. Supp. 533 (D. Utah 1991). 
65. 763 F. Supp. at 538 (stating that Senators Heflin and Sanford expressed concern over a 
plan that would greatly increase the authority of the FDIC over financial institutions). 
66. 135 CoNG. REc. S4264 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989). 
67. Id. at 84276-77. Senator Sanford's remarks indicate that he himself was confused about 
the scope of preemption. For example, shortly after stating that FIRREA "permit[s) the FDIC 
to bring an action ... if the director or officer acted with gross negligence or committed an 
intentional tort," he went on to say that "the preemption of State law permitted by this bill is 
limited solely ... to those cases in which the directors or officers have committed intentional torts 
or acts of gross negligence." Id. (emphasis added). However, even if the statements of Senators 
Heflin and Sanford are interpreted to support massive preemption of state and federal common 
law, the statements are not persuasive when the many other statements of intent are taken into 
consideration. Cf Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 585 (1988) (views of opponents of a bill are not persuasive with respect to 
its meaning). 
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House and Committee did change the language of the Senate bill, 
promulgating the version of section 1821(k) that Congress eventually 
enacted. 68 However, an examination of the relevant House reports, 
hearings, 69 and floor debates pertaining to FIRREA and the Confer-
ence Committee report reveals that, in making these changes, neither 
the House nor the Committee wished to alter the Senate's intent that 
FIRREA only preempt insulating statutes. 
The House suggested several times that FIRREA would increase 
the supervisory and enforcement authority of the FDIC.70 An inter-
pretation that FIRREA preempts all state and federal law claims for 
negligence would weaken, not enhance, the power of the FDIC to 
oversee the activities of financial institutions. 71 Testimony during 
House hearings on FIRREA also demonstrates that the House was 
aware of the need to impose liability on numerous parties whose negli-
gent actions contributed to the problems of S&Ls. 72 
Courts advancing the uniform standard interpretation of section 
1821(k) have relied almost exclusively on the Conference Report in 
concluding that no "clearly expressed legislative intention" existed re-
garding whether FIRREA preempts negligence actions brought by the 
FDIC.73 The Conference Report states that section 182l(k) 
"preempts State law with respect to claims brought by the FDIC in 
any capacity against officers or directors of an insured depository insti-
tution. The preemption allows the FDIC to pursue claims for gross 
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
69. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 11, at § 48.10 (stating that the members of Congress 
are assumed to have knowledge of committee hearing statments). 
70. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 26 (1989), reprinted in 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 397, 409 ("bill would significantly expand the supervisory and enforcement nu· 
thority of the Federal Government with respect to the thrifts"); H.R. REP. No. 54, lOlst Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. 7, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 421, 421-22 (bill would "provide 
increased enforcement authority"); id. at 6 ("bill would impose tighter restrictions on activities of 
the thrifts"). Additionally, comments made during the hearings also suggest that House mem-
bers desired to punish officers and directors for negligent acts. See Failure of Independent CPA'.!' 
To Identify Fraud, Waste and Mismanagement and Assure Accurate Financial Position of Trou-
bled S&L '.!': Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) [hereinafter CPA'.!' Hearing]. 
71. See infra Part III. 
72. CPA's Hearing, supra note 70, at 12 (statement of Frederick D. Wolf, Assistant Comp-
troller General) ("[F]inancial institutional failures have often been associated with mnnagement-
related problems such as serious internal control weaknesses, insider abuse and fraud, unrespon-
siveness to regulators and disregard for the safety and soundness offinancial operations.''); id. at 
64 (statement of William Gladstone, Chairman, Arthur Young & Co.) ("Even today troubled 
S&L's are offering inflated interest rates to attract depositors . . . .''); id. at 85 (statement of 
Thomas Myers, President, T.A. Myers & Co.) ("I would concur with [Representative LaFalce] 
about the directors and officers .... [Those] who were involved in negligent situations ••• should 
be pursued."). 
73. See FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (D. Minn. 1991); FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. 
Supp. 533, 539 (D. Utah 1991). In contrast, theMcSweeney court did not discuss the Conference 
report in holding that FIRREA does not "prejudic[e] the FDIC's full range of rights in those 
states that had not passed protective legislation for directors [and officers]." FDIC v. Mc-
sweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 1991). 
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negligence or any conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a 
duty of care .... " 74 At first blush this language seems to imply that 
the conferees disregarded both the intent of the Senate and the state-
ments made by several representatives that FIRREA would effect only 
a narrow preemption of state and federal law. However, an examina-
tion of the dynamics of the enactment process reveals that the report 
does not necessarily conflict with the conclusion that Congress in-
tended FIRREA simply to preempt insulating statutes. 
The Conference Report is inconclusive regarding the preemption 
issue. First, its drafters wrote the Report very hastily. 75 Because of 
FIRREA's rapid journey through Congress, the authors of the Report 
did not have time to write an in-depth description of every provision in 
the bill. 76 The authors s~ply e~pressed their desire to preempt state 
law to some extent - by superseding insulating statutes - but did not 
clearly articulate their desire to allow the FDIC to bring state law 
claims in states with a simple negligence standard. 
Furthermore, the authors of the Conference Report never indi-
cated that the rewording of section 1821(k) represented a substantive 
change from the original versions of this section approved by the Sen-
ate. 77 Because the Conference Committee indicated each time it al-
tered the meaning of other sections of FIRREA from the original 
Senate version, 78 the lack of such a statement with regard to section 
74. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 222, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 398 (1989), reprinted in 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 437 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
75. As Senator Riegle stated, Congress put together "the most sweeping financial services 
reform package ... in record time." He went on to say, "[i]t is roughly a thousand pages of 
. legislation, and any time a bill has to be that long because of its complexity, particularly of a 
problem of this kind, it speaks for itself, of its far-ranging nature and the difficulty of doing it and 
doing it on a timely basis and having it right." 135 CoNG. REc. S9872 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989). 
Additionally, the Conference Report was drafted in an extremely short time span. See 135 CONG. 
REc. 0879 (daily ed. July 27, 1989) (conferees agree to file report) and 135 CONG. REc. S9871, 
H5331 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (report received from conference committee); cf Clark et al., 
supra note 2, at 1015 n.16 (noting that FIRREA itself is unclear in some areas as a result of the 
remarkable speed with which it moved through Congress). ' 
76. The "Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference" is only 75 pages 
long. See CoNFERENCE REPORT, supra note 74, at 393-467. The actual statute consists of 390 
pages. See id. at 1-392. 
77. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 490 (1985) (if Congress wishes to 
change the law in a "novel way,'' some mention of this intent should be present in the statute or 
the legislative history); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489 n.8 (recognizing that a minor departure in word-
ing, without more, does not indicate a fundamental change in meaning); NLRB v. Hendricks 
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 177 (1981) (stating that inaction in the 
face of an already promulgated construction suggests that such construction be followed). 
78. See CoNFERENCE REPORT, supra note 74, at 393 ("The differences between the House 
bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute agreed to in conference are noted below, except 
for clerical corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements reached by the con-
ferees, and minor drafting and clarifying changes.") (emphasis added); id. at 396 ("cho[osing] the 
Senate requirements .•. rather than the House"); id. at 402 ("[c]onferees deleted from statutory 
language the ..• requirements enacted by the Senate"); id. at 417 ("conference agreement con-
tains the House proposal with a number of significant changes"); id. at 422 (report not authoriz-
ing funds provided for in House bill); id. at 430 (report adopting House provision with an 
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182l(k) strongly implies that the Committee intended no substantive 
change in the meaning of this section. The similarity between the lan-
guage of the two provisions also indicates that the House meant to 
make no substantive changes in the provision. 79 The Conference Re-
port, then, is consistent with the minimum standard interpretation of 
section 1821(k). 
C. Senate Consideration of the House and Conference 
Version of FIRREA 
The Senate considered the changes made in the House and Confer-
ence version of FIRREA and eventually passed that version with sev-
eral minor amendments. 80 Several senators reiterated their earlier 
views that FIRREA increased, rather than decreased, the control of 
the FDIC over insured depository institutions.81 Reading section 
1821(k) as mandating a uniform standard actually decreases, not in-
creases, the effectiveness of the FDIC's enforcement mechanisms.82 
amendment); id. at 431 (same); id. at 432 (report adopts House provision); id. at 433 (report 
contains House provision with an amendment); id. at 437 (pointing out differences between the 
House and Senate bills); id. at 438 (report contains the House provision with an amendment); id. 
at 443 (conferees deleting section of House bill); id. at 446 (pointing out similarities between the 
Senate and House versions); id. at 451 (report contains House version plus an amendment); id. at 
457 (House version adopted with modifications); id .. at 458 (report contains amended language of 
the House bill); id. (adopting House provisions as modified); id. at 459 (pointing out where 
House recedes to Senate provision and where Senate recedes to House version); id. at 460 (House 
provision adopted with amendments); id. (conferees deleted from statute certain requirements 
enacted by the House); id. at 461 (conferees clarifying House provision and stating provision 
should be construed narrowly); id. at 463 (adopting House bill with certain clarifications); id. at 
464-65 (conferees follow House bill since Senate bill had no provision); id. at 465 (same); id. at 
466 (following House bill with certain changes). 
79. Cf Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 552 (1987) ("The similarity 
between the language of [a statute] and its two predecessor statutes .•• also refutes the conten· 
tion that Congress intended [any substantive change]."). 
80. These minor amendments are not relevant to this Note. 
81. 135 CONG. REc. S987 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Riegle) (FIRREA 
"raise[s] the standards"); id. at Sl0,200 (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("The legislation ••• in· 
creas[es] civil money penalties in cases when a bank, thrift ... or an individual connected to the 
institution[] violates regulations or engages in a unsafe or unsound practice • • . • I am confident 
that this and other requirements contained in the S&L bill will discourage abuse and mismanage-
ment .... ") (emphasis added); id. at Sl0,206 (statement of Sen. Dixon) ("[A]ny thrift legislation 
we enact will only work if ... it goes after those whose negligence and criminal behavior contrib· 
uted to this problem .•.. They must be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Legislation must 
ensure that they are not permitted to profit from their greed, their negligence, or their criminal 
behavior.") (emphasis added); id. at Sl0,209 (statement of Sen. Cranston) ("bill has many admi· 
rable qualities such as ..• [n]ew increased civil penalties and enforcement provisions to prosecute 
those who are to blame for a huge costly mess"). Senator Riegle, in reference to the extended 
statute oflimitations period promulgated under FIRREA, stated that "[t]he provisions should be 
construed to maximize potential recoveries by the Federal Government by preserving to the great· 
est extent possible by law claims that otherwise would have been lost to the expiration of hitherto 
applicable limitations periods." Id. at Sl0,205 (emphasis added); cf Clark et al., supra note 2, at 
1028 (recognizing that FIRREA significantly expands the supervisory and enforcement author-
ity of the FDIC). Senator Riegle's statement demonstrates his concern with maximizing the 
FD I C's options for recovery from officers and directors of financial institutions. 
82. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. 
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If any senator believed that section 1821(k) as promulgated by the 
House substantively changed the Senate's version of that section, the 
debate does not show it. As the Senate debate over the House version 
of FIRREA showed, 83 the Senate believed the House changes con-
cerned only whether the S&L bailout should be financed "off-budget" 
or "on-budget" and whether the affordable housing amendments 
added to FIRREA by the House should be retained.84 No senator 
indicated that the House had made any substantive changes in section 
1821(k) - in fact, the statements made in the Senate show that the 
intent of section 1821(k) remained unchanged, even if the words had 
been slightly altered. 85 
Thus, the legislative history of FIRREA supports the minimum 
standard interpretation of section 182l(k). The Senate rejected an at-
tempt to preempt generally state law in the area of officer and director 
liability in favor of a version of FIRREA that preempted only state 
insulating statutes. The House and the Conference Committee, 
although changing the proposed language of section 1821(k), did not 
intend to change substantively the meaning of the provision passed by 
the Senate. 
Ill. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE INTERPRETATION OF 
SECTION 182l(k) 
This Part examines policy arguments for and against the preemp-
tion of state law by section 1821(k)'s gross negligence standard. It 
concludes that the policies and purposes underlying FIRREA weigh 
in favor of reading section 1821(k) as preempting only insulating stat-
utes and preserving the right of the FDIC to bring negligence actions 
in those states that allow them. 
Congress, when enacting FIRREA, stated that its primary pur-
poses included promoting a safe and stable system of housing finance, 
curtailing excessively speculative investments, putting the federal de-
posit insurance fund on sound financial footing, providing funds from 
nontaxpayer sources to help pay for the S&L bailout, and strengthen-
ing the powers of the FDIC to oversee financial institutions. 86 The 
83. See 135 CoNG. R.Ec. 89871-99 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989). 
84. See Marirose K. Lescher & Merwin A. Mace, III, Financing the Bailout of the Thrift 
Crisis: Workings of the Financing Corporation and the Resolution Funding Corporation, 46 Bus. 
LAW. 507, 532 (1991). 
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
86. In relevant part, the Report provides: 
The primary purposes of the bill are: 
(1) to promote, through regulatory reform, a safe and stable system of affordable housing 
finance: (2) to improve the supervision of savings associations by strengthening capital, ac-
counting, and other supervisory standards; (3) to curtail investments and other activities of 
savings associations that pose unacceptable risks to the Federal deposit insurance funds: ( 4) to 
promote the independence of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation through an in-
dependent board of directors, adequate funding, and appropriate powers; (5) to put the Fed-
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Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that courts should look to con-
gressional policy pronouncements such as these to interpret provisions 
like section 1821(k).87 Accordingly, section III.A examines policies 
that favor the minimum standard of care interpretation. Section 111.B 
scrutinizes those competing policies that seem to favor the uniform 
standard of care interpretation. This Part concludes that the policies 
underlying FIRREA can best be served by allowing states to impose a 
more stringent standard of care than the gross negligence standard 
Congress provided in FIRREA. 
A. Arguments Advanced in Support of the Minimum Standard 
Interpretation of Section 182J(k) 
Judicial interpretation of section 1821(k) as a minimum standard 
will help promote "a safe and stable system of affordable housing fi-
nance" by ensuring a continued flow of affordable mortgage financ-
ing. 88 During the period immediately preceding and extending 
through the current S&L crisis, institutions that traditionally concen-
trated their lending activities in home mortgage financing increasingly 
transferred their funds into riskier and more speculative investments. 89 
era/ deposit insurance funds on a sound financial footing for the future; (6) to establish an 
Office of Thrift Supervision in the Department of the Treasury, under the general oversight 
of the Secretary of the Treasury; (7) to create a new corporation, to be known as the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation, to deal with failed thrift institutions; (8) to provide funds from public 
and private sources to deal expeditiously with failed financial institutions; (9) to strengthen the 
enforcement powers of Federal regulators of financial institutions; (JO) to strengthen the pen-
alties far defrauding or otherwise damaging financial institutions and their depository. 
CoNFERENCE REPORT, supra note 74, at 393 (emphasis added). 
87. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) ("In determining the mean-
ing of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the 
statute as a whole and to its object and policy."); Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36-38 
(1990) (statute must be construed to effectuate its purposes as defined by Congress); Boys Mkts., 
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970) ("[C]onsideration must be given to the 
total corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired [a statute]."); United States v. Ameri-
can Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of 
words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its 
use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination'.") (citations omitted). 
88. See supra note 86. 
89. The share of S&L industry assets devoted to home mortgage lending decreased from 
67% in 1980 to 39% by 1988, the period of S&L deregulation. James R. Barth et al., Moral 
Hazard and the Thrift Crisis: An Empirical Analysis, 44 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 22, 24 
(1990). The statements of Thomas A. Myers, president of T.A. Myers & Co., are especially 
insightful on this matter: 
[S]ome fast growing savings and loan associations poured money into high-risk invest-
ment and lending situations. 
Acquisition development and construction lending became common where 100 percent 
or more of project funding, including reserves for interest, were often provided by the lender 
in exchange for a participation in profits. 
Overnight a number of thrifts went from single-family home lending to more exotic loan 
and investment vehicles. The lending program for certain of these thrifts was typified by 
poor underwriting procedures and an emphasis on taking risks, as thrift managers played an 
aggressive lending game in which "heads they would win and tails the FSLIC would lose." 
CPA's Hearing, supra note 70, at 60; see also H.R. REP. No. 54, lOlst Cong., 1st sess., pt. 7, at 6 
(1989), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 421, 426 ("The tendency of weakly capitalized thrifts to un-
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These speculative investments played a major role in causing the cur-
rent crisis by rendering many institutions insolvent as the investments 
increasingly failed.90 Allowing the FDIC to pursue negligence actions 
against the officers and directors of insured financial institutions 
should inhibit the unreasonably speculative investment of an institu-
tion's funds.91 Because officers and directors know they may be forced 
to reimburse the FDIC for any losses caused by their overly specula-
tive investment strategy, they are more likely to channel investment 
funds into the home lending market, thereby allowing more people to 
borrow funds necessary for home ownership.92 Most importantly, de-
positors' funds will be much safer and the FDIC's liability much less 
than current levels. 93 
AJJ.y deposit insurance system must ultimately deal with the prob-
lem of "moral hazard. "94 A moral hazard arises because an insured 
dertake excessively risky investments is an important source of the current problem."); ROBERT 
E. BARNETT, REsPONSIBILmES AND LIABILlTIES OF BANK AND BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
DIRECTORS 11 (1985) (stating that unusually rapid growth can be a danger signal); Kenneth E. 
Scott, Never Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 Bus. LAW. 1883, 1892 (1990) (S&Ls that strayed 
from traditional investment strategies were particularly hard hit by insolvency). 
90. See Problems of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation: Hearings Before 
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong., 1st sess., pt. 1, at 244 
[hereinafter Problems Hearing] (statement of Paul Volcker) ("[T]he largest losses have been con-
centrated in institutions moving away from home mortgage lending .... "); id. at 265 (statement 
of Paul Volcker) ("[T]he most successful and profitable institutions currently are those that fol-
lowed, basically, traditional saving and loan patterns. They are heavily concentrated on home 
mortgage lending."); id., pt. 2, at 43 (statement of Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury) 
("[T]he great body of successful savings and loans are ones that have stuck to [home mortgage 
lending] and earned a decent, reasonable profit, not extraordinary profits ...• "). Indeed, reading 
§ 1821(k) as mandating a uniform standard "creates the perverse incentive for a director in an 
institution that is having financial difficulty to permit the thrift to fall into ruin - benignly and 
with a lesser degree of fault than gross negligence - since the director's own exposure would be 
greatly reduced upon the institution of a receivership." FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 
1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991); see also Clark et al., supra note 2, at 1021; Scott, supra note 89, at 1890; 
infra note 102. 
91. FIRREA should not be read as an attempt to eliminate entirely the element of risk from 
an institution's asset portfolio, clearly an impossibility. See Scott, supra note 89, at 1894. This 
Note does suggest that savings associations should either devote more resources to traditional 
home mortgage lending or, if they should expand into other areas, retain employees who have the 
necessary expertise to formulate wise investment strategies and decisions. If an institution ag-
gressively devotes its funds to nontraditional investments and the institution is harmed as a result 
of the new investment strategy, managers that did not consult persons who have special expertise 
in the new area of investment should be found to be negligent. 
92. The FDIC's proposed new rules, which lessen the costs incurred by S&Ls in making 
mortgage loans, should further expand the funds available for home mortgage lending. See Ste-
phen Labaton, U.S. Seeks Eased Rule for Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at Dl. 
93. "Deposit insurance was designed to cover individuals who put their life savings into 
banks, not to finance speculative activities." Allan Sloan & Howard Rudnitsky, What Will the 
Bank Dicks Do Now?, FORBES, July l, 1985, at 86, 89 (quoting then-FDIC chairman William 
Isaac). 
94. See, e.g., Barth et al., supra note 89; Scott, supra note 89, at 1886; Kenneth E. Scott & 
Thomas Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance 
Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv. 857, 886-87 (1971); Alex M. Azar II, Note, FIRREA: Controlling 
Savings and Loan Association Credit Risk Through Capital Standards and Asset Restrictions, 100 
YALE L.J. 149, 154-57 (1990). For a graphical analysis of the effects that deposit insurance has 
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institution can undertake risky investments, confident that the insur-
ance fund will ultimately cover all the institution's losses.95 Similarly, 
the insurance fund also gives insured depositors little incentive to im-
pose discipline on the lending industry.96 Furthermore, for those insti-
tutions that are publicly traded, neither shareholder discipline nor 
discipline imposed by the takeover market has effectively deterred op-
portunism, excessive risk-taking, or other managerial conduct that can 
lead to insolvency.97 
Interpreting section 1821(k) to allow negligence actions will help 
the FDIC deal with the moral hazard problem. By holding the officers 
and directors of financial institutions liable for any losses that they 
cause through negligent conduct, FIRREA gives these individuals 
greater incentive to make sounder, safer, and more prudent operating 
decisions. If officers and directors must reimburse the fund for losses 
caused by their negligent conduct, they should be sufficiently deterred 
from poor and uninformed decisionmaking.98 
on the riskiness of an institution's investments, see Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Bank-
ing and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481, 509-13 (1988). 
95. Deregulation exacerbated this problem by allowing the thrift industry to pursue exces-
sively risky lending activities in search of higher profits, increasing the likelihood of S&L failures. 
Barth et al., supra note 89, at 28. Also, "[t]he management of many savings associations lacked 
the necessary expertise to take profitable advantage of their expanded lending and investment 
powers." Clark et al., supra note 2, at 1021-22. This lack of expertise suggests not only that the 
officers are liable for negligence, but that the directors are also liable for negligence because they 
neither barred the officers from investing in areas in which the officers had little or no expertise 
nor did they act to bring in outsiders who had the necessary expertise. See OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CuRRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK: THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL 
BANK DIRECTOR, 21, 23 (1987) [hereinafter THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK] ("Many new undertakings 
require substantial systems support and new expertise. . . . Outside experts can help the board 
evaluate the likely impact of proposed policies and procedures."). 
96. Barth et al., supra note 89, at 29; Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure, 50 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1159, 1180-87 (1989). In fact, some evidence exists that depositors are ignoring chances 
to discipline troubled institutions in favor of taking advantage of the deposit insurance system. 
See Sharon Walsh, Bank Customers Shufl/ing Accounts to Ensure Federal Protection, WASH. 
Posr, Aug. 22, 1991, at C13 (depositors splitting up large accounts into accounts of $100,000 or 
less in order to be fully protected by deposit insurance). 
97. Garten, supra note 96, at 1177, 1187-94; cf id. at 1177 n.104 (noting that agency costs 
allow management to pursue its own goals rather than those of the institution's real risk-bearers). 
98. For a discussion of the fundamental notion that changes in the standard of care effect 
changes in conduct, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC· 
TUREOFTORTLAW 39-41 (1987). CJ Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895, 903 (M.D. Fla.1972) 
(stating that a higher standard of care is required of financial institution directors); FSLIC v. 
Huff, 704 P.2d 372, 378 (Kan. 1985) (same); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 136 N.E. 403, 
408 (Mass. 1922) (same); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (same); Hun v. 
Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880) (same); BARNETT, supra note 89, at 18 (noting that financial institu-
tion directors should exercise greater care than the average businessperson); THE DIRECTOR'S 
BooK, supra note 95, at 9 ("Bank directors face special challenges, however, because ••. most of 
the funds they put at risk belong to others."); Carol Galbraith & Joseph Seidel, FDIC v. Impru-
dent Banking Officials: The Enforcement Apparatus, 104 BANKING L.J. 92, 92 (1987) ("[A] 
weak, negligent board of directors can often be the single most important factor leading to a 
failure."); Charles D. Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for 
Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 157, 163 (1970) (suggesting that bank directors should be 
held to stricter standards than other corporate directors). But cj Richard B. Dyson, The Direc-
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In addition to channeling money away from risky investment ac-
tivities, a standard of negligence should force officers and directors of 
financial institutions to institute and follow prudent underwriting con-
trols, 99 pay closer attention to federal banking regulations, 100 and ob-
tain more information about potential lending activities.101 Providing 
an institution's management with incentives to procure more informa-
tion about potential borrowers and their uses of borrowed funds 
should result in better lending practices and lower costs to the FDIC 
and taxpayers. 102 Further, because credit risk - the possibility that 
borrowers will default on their loans - is the principal cause of the 
current S&L crisis, 103 a standard of care that causes financial institu-
tions to strengthen their lending policies and supervisory mechanisms 
should reduce the default rate. 104 
tor's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 343-44 (1965) (because bank directors are often 
local citizens with no particular business skill, the community may wish to hold them to a lesser 
standard). 
99. See CPA's Hearing, supra note 70, at 200 (statement of Frederick Wolf) (failures often 
associated with serious internal control weaknesses); id. at 171 (statement of Thomas Myers) 
("vast majority of failed thrifts exhibited virtually no effective controls in [their underwriting 
systems]"); THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 95, at 19 ("[The board] is expected to supervise 
bank operations to ensure that they reflect sound planning, are effectively governed by compte-
hensive policies and internal control and compliance procedures, and are administered by compe-
tent management."). 
100. See CPA's Hearing, supra note 70, at 232 Qetter from Thomas A. Myers) (institutions 
violating regulatory standards). 
101. Id. at 60 (statement of Thomas Myers) (S&Ls often accepted developers' appraisals and 
market studies without much question); id. at 171-72 (statement of Thomas Myers) (opportunis-
tic buyers preyed on inept lenders who were lackadaisical or aggressively stupid in lending deci-
sions); id. at 233 Qetter from Thomas Myers) (S&Ls purchasing direct investments without the 
expertise required to evaluate fully and analyze the economics of them). 
102. Many S&Ls today are apparently still engaging in imprudent activities, even after the 
huge debacle of the recent past. See id. at 64 (statement of William Gladstone) ("Even today 
troubled S&Ls are offering inflated interest rates to attract depositors .... "). 
103. Azar, supra note 94, at 152, 153-54; see also Barth et al., supra note 89, at 24 (all of the 
record $12 billion S&L losses in 1988 was due to nonoperating factors and taxes). S&Ls face two 
other main risks: interest rate risk and liquidity risk. See generally Azar, supra note 94, at 151-
52. 
104. For example, a study by the Office of the Comptroller General found that 
"[m]anagement-driven weaknesses played a significant role in the decline of 90 percent of the 
failed and problem banks" between 1979 and 1987. National Banks: OCC Study Evaluates Fac-
tors Contributing to the Failure of National Banks, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. 
Rep. (CCH) 11 87,387, at 93,979-83 (June 30, 1988). In these banks, 81% either had no loan 
policies or failed to follow them; 69% had inadequate oversight mechanisms by which compli-
ance with internal policies or banking laws could be ensured; 63% exhibited inadequate control 
and supervision of bank officers; 59% inadequately identified problem loans; 57% were domi-
nated by a single officer, director, or stockholder; and 49% had nonexistent or inadequately 
followed policies for asset and liability management. Additionally, the OCC found that 86% of 
the failed banks had extremely liberal lending policies; 51 % had excessive loan growth in relation 
to the expertise and abilities of management and the internal oversight systems; 41% placed 
undue reliance on overly volatile assets; 38% had inadequate liquid assets; 81 % exhibited inade-
quate credit examinations and reports; 72% showed overlending to borrowers; 53% lent based 
on collateral value rather than cash flow; and 36% showed an unwarranted concentration of 
credits. Insider abuse was found to be a significant factor in 35% of the failed banks. Id. at 
93,981-82. 
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The interpretation of section 1821(k) as providing a m1mmum 
standard of care will lessen the negative impact of financial institution 
failures. The decline of the S&L industry, or even the demise of a 
single institution, has many repercussions both locally and nationally. 
An institution's failure often freezes depositors' funds, imperils credi-
tors of the institution, causes an increase in unemployment, and results 
in the consumption of valuable judicial and administrative re-
sources.105 Furthermore, "[d]eposit insurance gives certain innocent 
bystanders - healthy banks and their depositors, the bank regulatory 
system, and the public - a stake in bank failure that is more direct 
than ... in other business failure." 106 This interest arises because each 
failure can result in higher insurance premiums for healthy banks -
and at least part of this increased cost of doing business is likely to be 
passed on to consumers - and a loss of public confidence in the sys-
tem.107 A negligence standard should lead to a more careful and bet-
ter informed decisionmaking process, 108 minimizing economic 
disruptions and declines in consumer confidence caused by failures. 109 
The minimum standard interpretation of section 1821(k) will in-
crease the contribution of the private sector, reducing the cost to the 
taxpayers of the S&L bailout. If courts allow the FDIC to pursue 
negligence actions, it will be able to recover funds from those individu-
als who, through their negligence, helped to cause the current S&L 
crisis, thereby reducing the amount of taxpayer funds that must be 
expended to resolve the crisis.110 If the FDIC can pursue negligence 
105. FSLIC v. Huff, 704 P.2d 372, 379 (Kan. 1985) (a failure has a direct effect on the 
construction, sale and resale of houses, which in turn affects many other areas of the economy); 
Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 136 N.E. 403, 405 (Mass. 1922) (noting the "vast impor-
tance" of financial institutions to "commercial prosperity"); THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 
95, at 1 (financial service industry serves an important function in the nation's economy); Garten, 
supra note 96, at 1166, 1171-72. But see Halpert, supra note 94, at 521-22 (recognizing these 
costs but suggesting they do not necessarily diminish social welfare). 
106. Garten, supra note 96, at 1166;seea/so BARNE1T,supra note 89, at 10 (directors assume 
responsibilities to the institution itself, shareholders, depositors, management, employees, the 
community at large and also to the industry as a whole); THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 95, 
at 39 (''The board's concern for the financial success of its shareholders must be tempered ••• by 
its responsibilities to the bank's depositors, employees, and community."); Dyson, supra note 98, 
at 343 (depositors as possible plaintiffs). 
107. Huff. 704 P.2d at 379; see also Joel G. Brenner, Perpetual Reports Fall in Deposits, 
WASH. Posr, Nov. 26, 1991, at Dl ($736 million withdrawn from thrift during first nine months 
after negative reports concerning its financial condition); 55% in Poll See Banks as Unsound, 
CHI. TRIB., July 5, 1991, at Cl. 
108. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
109. Additionally, even under FIRREA, an institution's management may "change drasti-
cally the risk profile of an institution ... by a massive program of asset disposition and reinvest-
ment" without attracting the attention of FDIC regulators. Scott, supra note 89, at 1897. 
Allowing the FDIC to pursue negligence actions against the directors and officers of any institu-
tion that undertakes such acts should be sufficient to deter them because the officers and directors 
know that they can be held liable for any resulting losses. 
110. BARNE1T, supra note 89, at 69-70 ("Almost all of the recent FDIC suits against direc· 
tors have been settled prior to trial, some for settlement amounts of millions of dollars."); see 
CPA's Hearing, supra note 70, at 86 (statement of Rep. LaFalce) ("What I want to do is get as 
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actions against officers and directors, it will be able to recover from a 
greater number of culpable individuals than if gross negligence was the 
uniform standard of care.111 By enlarging the pool of potential 
targets, FIRREA expands the amount of total liability and thereby 
increases the amount of private contributions to the bailout fund. 112 
The minimum standard interpretation of section 1821(k) also 
strengthens both the FDIC's enforcement powers and the sanctions 
imposed on those who harm insured depository institutions.113 Con-
gress, through FIRREA, sought to strengthen civil sanctions against 
those persons who damage insured financial institutions.114 Interpret-
ing section 1821(k) as providing a uniform gross negligence standard, 
however, would have the opposite effect. Instead of being able to 
plead and prove simple negligence on the part of a defendant, the 
FDIC would be forced to plead and prove conduct amounting to at 
least gross negligence before it could recover squandered funds. 115 
This interpretation would have the unanticipated result of imposing on 
the FDIC "a more stringent pleading burden [and burden of proof] 
than that which faced its predecessors in interest."116 Reading section 
1821(k) as preempting all state law, then, would damage the FDIC's 
much non·taxpayer money as possible .... "); 135 CONG. REc. 84273 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) 
(statement of Sen. Riegle) ("[E]very dollar that we recover .•• is a dollar that the taxpayer does 
not have to pay."). See also FDIC v. Burrell, 1991 WL 256362, at *4 (S.D. Iowa July 17, 1991) 
(noting the FDIC's claim that preemption of negligence actions would result in "manifest injus-
tice to the right of the FDIC to seek to replenish the insurance fund"). 
111. See Sarah Bartlett, Savings Fraud Losses Seen as Lost for Good, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 10, 
1989, at Dl (FDIC recovered $50 million in civil suits during 1988). 
112. See United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) ("As 
the size of the defendant pool increases, the chances for settlement of the suit and achievement of 
one of the federal government's objectives under [CERCLA]-[payment by the] responsible par-
ties - is met."); Elizabeth A. McLaughin, Comment, Civil Money Penalties in the Financial 
Institutions Reflmn, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989: An Analysis, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. 
REv. 289, 294 (1990) (noting that FIRREA's civil money penalties were intended to accomplish 
restitution). 
113. See supra note 86. 
114. For examples of FIRREA provisions other than section 182l(k) that increase the 
FDIC's enforcement powers, see 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1786(e)-(f), 1818(b)-(c) (West 1989 & Supp. 
1991) (expanded cease and desist powers); 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1817(j)(16), 1818(i)(2), 1828(j)(4) 
(West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (expanded and increased civil money penalties); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1847 
(West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (criminal and civil penalties). 
115. FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991). 
116. Mcsweeney, 112 F. Supp. at 1159; see also FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 n.4 
(D. Minn. 1991) (recognizing this conflict but concluding that the plain language of section 
182l(k) requires this result); BARNE'IT, supra note 89, at 23 (stating that an institution may bring 
suit against directors based on the common law); THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 95, at 56 
(stating that suits for a director's violation of the common law duty of care may be brought by 
shareholders, depositors, and creditors who have been injured by the violation); Raymond G. 
Kawasaki, Note, Liability of Attorneys, Accountants, Appraisers, and Other Independent Contrac-
tors Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 42 HAST. 
L.J. 249, 273 (1990) ("Presumably regulators still may institute lawsuits against independent 
contractors based on a common law negligence cause of action."). 
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ability to sue incompetent officers and directors of depository 
institutions. 
Finally, by reading section 1821(k) as supplying a minimum stan-
dard, courts may ensure that all persons whose negligence contributed 
to the demise of an institution are made to bear the consequences. A 
negligence action is valuable as an additional enforcement mechanism 
available to the FDIC, especially in those cases in which the conduct 
at issue does not "present a strong basis for statutory enforcement pro-
ceedings." 117 A negligence action also gives the FDIC the opportunity 
to proceed in the most economically efficient fashion.11s 
B. Arguments Advanced in Support of Interpreting Section 1821(k) 
as a Uniform Standard 
1. Deterring Competent Persons from Accepting Positions with 
Financial Institutions 
Some have argued that the minimum standard interpretation of 
section 1821(k) would deter qualified and competent people from be-
coming officers and directors of financial institutions.119 As one court 
has stated, "[o]ne motivation for sheltering officers and directors from 
claims for ordinary negligence is the important interest in encouraging 
aggressive and ambitious leaders to take the necessary steps to remedy 
the financial institution crisis this country faces." 120 The thrust of this 
argument is that a simple negligence standard deters risk-averse or 
risk-neutral people from becoming officers and directors.121 However, 
such people always have the option of procuring director and officer 
liability insurance (D&O insurance).122 Although competent people 
conceivably should not be forced by fear of liability to expend their 
117. Vartanian & Schley, supra note 10, at 1029. 
118. Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Corp., 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985) (noting that the govern-
ment may choose to pursue civil remedies instead of other available options). 
119. See FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533, 539 (D. Utah 1991). 
120. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. at 539. 
121. The Canfield court, when it spoke of "aggressive and ambitious leaders," may have been 
expressing a preference for risk-seeking individuals. If so, this preference is misplaced. After all, 
overly risky investments caused the S&L crisis. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text. 
See also Problems Hearing, supra note 90, at 66 (statement of Lowell L. Bryan, Director and 
Senior Partner, McKinsey & Co.) ("[W]hen an institution gets in trouble, the easy way out is 
always ..• simply [to] take more risk."); id. at 244 (statement of Paul Volcker) ("[T]he largest 
losses have been concentrated in institutions moving away from home mortgage lending and 
aggressively exploiting ..• some new or broadened powers provided thrifts in recent years, espe-
cially by some states."). Furthermore, risk-seeking persons are likely to ignore standards of care 
because they, by their very nature, will take extraordinary risks, especially when they know that 
the full faith and credit of the FDIC is guaranteeing whatever adverse results may occur. 
122. See BARNEIT, supra note 89, at 82 (stating that directors should insist on insurance 
before agreeing to serve); CPA's Hearing. supra note 70, at 234 (statement of Thomas Myers) 
("Directors and officers are normally cognizant of the potential liability that they may face as a 
result of their negligence, ineptitude or fraudulent misconduct and are, therefore, frequently cov-
ered by directors and officers liability insurance ..• ,"). 
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own money on D&O insurance, prospective officers and directors may 
require the institution that is seeking their services to pay for or reim-
burse them for purchasing insurance as a condition to accepting the 
offer. 
Even if officers and directors are forced to pay for the insurance 
themselves, a requirement that they bear a portion of the risk of their 
own negligence seems fair. These individuals seem a more appropriate 
group to bear the risk than the taxpayers, particularly given the pres-
tige and significant renumeration of their positions.123 Therefore, even 
if some extremely risk-averse people will decline to be officers or direc-
tors of financial institutions, the net effect on the pool of qualified peo-
ple should not be inordinately large. 
Moreover, a negligence standard may appropriately deter those 
people who lack the requisite qualifications or expertise from becom-
ing directors of financial institutions.124 Also, it is worth noting that 
the law imposes a negligence standard of liability on a myriad of activ-
ities and many competent people still participate in them. Finally, no 
one has shown any pattern of adverse effects on the number of persons 
accepting offers to become officers or directors of financial institutions 
in those states that allowed negligence actions against the officers and 
directors of financial institutions before the enactment of FIRREA. 
2. "Crippling" Directors of Financial Institutions 
At least one court has argued that a negligence standard judges the 
conduct of officers and directors on the basis of hindsight. 125 This 
standard may make officers and directors fearful of having their deci-
sions second-guessed years later and, as a result, cause them to become 
"crippled, reluctant and ineffective."126 However, all standards, not 
merely the negligence standard, evaluate conduct on the basis of hind-
sight. Even if courts were to read section 182l(k) as mandating a uni-
form standard of gross negligence, they would still judge on the basis 
123. See Larry D. Soderquist, The Proper Standard for Directors' Negligence Liability, 66 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 37, 45 (1990) (suggesting that courts should punish directors for blame-
worthy conduct because the director receives a large stipend and a prestigious position from the 
institution but, by participating in the blameworthy conduct, fails to "keep faith" with the insti-
tution). For more information regarding director and officer insurance, see generally JOSEPH W. 
BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND 
INSURANCE (1981); Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance 
for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993 (1978). 
124. One study revealed that many people nominated as directors of banks in Georgia had no 
previous experience as bankers or directors of financial institutions. Robert F. Cook & Stanley 
H. Pollock, Bank Directors: Understanding Their Role, Responsibility and Liability, 40 MERCER 
L. REV. 587, 588 n.5 (1989). 
125. See FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533, 539 (D. Utah 1991). 
126. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. at 539. The court does not cite any authority for this proposi-
tion. The Canfield court goes on to state that a goal ofFIRREA was to make liability dependent 
upon culpable conduct. 763 F. Supp. at 540. A negligence standard, however, does hold people 
liable for culpable conduct. 
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of hindsight; officers and directors would still be fearful of courts sec-
ond-guessing their decisions. Additionally, there is no indication that 
a simple negligence standard "crippled" officers and directors in those 
states that followed such a standard before the passage of FIRREA. 
Furthermore, the fact that directors and officers can meet a negli-
gence standard relatively easily supports reading section 182l(k) to 
allow the FDIC to pursue negligence actions.127 One commentator 
has suggested that directors and officers can lessen the probability of 
liability for negligence by taking ten easy steps:128 (1) they should be 
thoroughly knowledgeable about their duties and the institution before 
accepting their positions; 129 (2) they must review all securities and reg-
ulatory filings for the prior three years; (3) they should request and 
receive necessary materials and agendas before board meetings and 
should attend those meetings;130 (4) they must acquaint themselves 
with current directors and top management to ensure competence and 
lack of conflicts; (5) they should review all reports of examinations and 
correspondence from regulatory agencies for the prior three years; ( 6) 
they should review all communications between auditors and the insti-
tution for the prior three years;131 (7) they must familiarize themselves 
with the existing plans for the future of the institution; (8) they must 
supervise and review the performance of management; 132 (9) they 
should disclose all conflicts of interest, their own and those of others; 
and (10) they must comply with all applicable laws. If they do not 
take these steps as consideration for the compensation and prestige 
they receive by virtue of their position, they ought to be held liable for 
all acts that damage the institution.133 
3. Fear of Frivolous Actions 
One court suggested that interpreting FIRREA to provide a uni-
form standard of gross negligence will prevent the FDIC from pursu-
ing costly litigation that it has little chance of winning.134 No evidence 
exists, however, to prove that the FDIC is bringing or will bring ac-
tions in which it has little chance of prevailing on the merits. 135 The 
127. See generally Ira S. Newman, Reducing the Risk of Bank Director Liability, 96 BANK-
ING L.J. 418, 427-36 (1979). 
128. John C. Deal, Liability of Bank Directors, 39 Bus. LAW. 1033, 1034-39 (1984); see also 
THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 95, at 19-52. 
129. See also Cook & Pollock, supra note 124, at 612 (officers and directors need to have a 
basic understanding of banking and bank laws and regulations). 
130. Id. (stating the need to attend board meetings). 
131. Id. (recognizing the need to be familiar with audits and supervisory communications). 
132. Id. (must ask questions and receive adequate explanations). 
133. See Soderquist, supra note 123, at 45. 
134. FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533, 540 (D. Utah 1991). 
135. Indeed, the Canfield court cites no authority for its proposition that the FDIC will 
bring baseless claims. One report has suggested, however, that the FDIC does not successfully 
pursue the vast majority of claims that are referred to it. See Sarah Bartlett, Savings Fraud 
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FDIC does not have unlimited funds-its sole economically rational 
choice is to pursue only cases in which it has a relatively high 
probability of recovering taxpayers' dollars. 136 This probability is de-
termined only after extensive investigation into the circumstances sur-
rounding the failure of an insured institution.137 The FDIC, on its 
own, has an incentive not to bring frivolous actions. 
4. Disservice of Federal Interests 
The most forceful argument in favor of the uniform gross negli-
gence standard is that such a standard will "clearly establish[ ] the 
parameters of liability for the benefit of officers and directors and the 
FDIC."138 However, "there is no federal interest in uniformity for its 
own sake."139 The true federal interest supports the minimum stan-
dard interpretation because institutions whose officers and directors 
are not liable for acts inconsistent with the goals of the deposit insur-
ance system should not be insured. If states, acting under their tradi-
tional authority in this area, 140 wish to hold the officers of state-
chartered S&Ls to a more exacting standard, they should be allowed 
to do so. Such a standard will increase both protection for the deposit 
insurance fund and security for those state residents who deposit their 
life savings in an insured depository institution.141 
Additionally, interpreting FIRREA to allow the FDIC to bring 
simple negligence actions will not create uncertainty. Directors and 
officers should know whether the state in which their financial institu-
Losses Seen as Lost for Good, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1989, at DI (From 1985 through 1988, the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board referred to the Department of Justice 14,613 criminal cases 
involving savings associations. During the period from 1984 through 1988, the Department of 
Justice obtained only 172 convictions for fraud or criminal misconduct involving such 
institutions.). 
136. Galbraith & Seidel, supra note 98, at 125 (contending that the FDIC is able to expand 
its litigation resources only as long as it is "economically justifiable"); Weinstock, supra note 4, at 
436-37 ("If the bank's failure resulted largely from economic factors or well-intentioned but 
unfortunate business decisions, it is unlikely that the FDIC will bring suit."). 
137. See Weinstock, supra note 4, at 436. 
138. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. at 540. 
139. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1980), cen. denied, 
454 U.S. 1128 (1981); see also FSLIC v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1325 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated, 
490 U.S. 1062 (1989); Amerifirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
140. See supra notes 23 and 31. 
141. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1979) (state law can be applied where its 
application does not significantly threaten any identifiable federal interests and where no unrea-
sonable or aberrant state rules are applied); Capozzi, 855 F.2d at 1325-26 ("[N]o substantive 
rights or duties of the federal government hinge on the outcome of [state law breach of duty 
claims]."); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d at 994 ("It is in the nature of a 
federal system that different states will apply different rules of law, based on their individual 
perceptions of what is in the best interests of their citizens."); Amerifirst Bank, 757 F. Supp. at 
1374 (permitting state law breach of duty claims "will not interfere with the successful function-
ing of the comprehensive federal [regulatory] scheme," even though different states may apply 
different rules); THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 95, at 1 ("This dual [regulatory] system 
allows each jurisdiction to govern its own system of banks."). 
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tion is incorporated permits representatives of the institution to pursue 
negligence actions against them. The mere fact that a potential direc-
tor or officer does not know such a fundamental fact suggests that she 
is not qualified to hold a position with potentially large liabilities. 
CONCLUSION 
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 attempted in section 1821(k) to give the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation a tool that it could use to recover funds from 
those parties who helped to bring about the current crisis. However, 
that tool is now in danger of being lost. A minority of courts have 
interpreted section 1821(k) to remove from the FDIC's arsenal the 
ability to pursue simple negligence actions against officers and direc-
tors of failed institutions. The courts following this interpretation 
have held that section 1821(k) implements a uniform standard of care 
and thereby preempts all state law in this area. Because the standard 
of care under section 1821(k) is gross negligence, these courts have 
held that the FDIC can no longer pursue some of the parties who are 
responsible for the current crisis. 
The majority view is that section 182l(k) sets a minimum standard 
that preempts all state law that allows a more relaxed standard of care. 
The courts adhering to this interpretation have held that the FDIC is 
still able to pursue simple negligence claims in those states that allow 
such actions. These courts interpret section 182l(k) in a way that aids 
the FDIC in its quest to seek out and recover funds from those officers 
and directors who are responsible for an insured institution's failure. 
The plain meaning of section 182l(k) supports the majority view 
that FIRREA merely sets a minimum standard of care of gross negli-
gence. The legislative history surrounding the passage of FIRREA 
and, specifically, section 1821(k) shows that Congress did not intend 
to preempt all state law in this area, but only to set a minimum stan-
dard. Finally, the policies and goals served by FIRREA support the 
majority view that section 182l(k) sets a minimum, not a uniform, 
standard of care. 
FIRREA gives the FDIC greater regulatory and enforcement 
powers over financial institutions by greatly revising the existing law 
governing the conduct of officers and directors of financial institutions. 
In response to the enormous cost imposed on the general public by the 
actions of people within the S&L industry, Congress attempted to en-
sure that such a debacle would never again occur. It would indeed be 
a Pyrrhic victory for the FDIC if this zealous protection of the deposit 
insurance fund were interpreted to strip the FDIC of one of its most 
powerful weapons in the fight against incompetence and fraud. Courts 
should interpret section 1821(k) to permit the FDIC to pursue negli-
gence actions in those states that allow them. 
